China - A National Regulatory Framework for the PRC\u27s Stock Markets Begins to Emerge by Tarbutton, Benjamin R.
CHINA-A NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRC'S
STOCK MARKETS BEGINS TO EMERGE
I. FACTuAL BACKGROUND
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is no longer a sleeping economic
dragon. China's move toward a more open market economy has unlocked
the nation's immense economic potential, spurring dizzying growth rates.
For the past two years the PRC's economy has grown at the staggering rate
of 13% per annum, and projections are only slightly less impressive for
1994.' China's emphasis on exporting has led to dramatically increased
trade and has resulted in trade surpluses with the outside world, particularly
with the West.2
Fueling this enormous growth has been the infusion of sorely needed
capital into the Chinese economy through the PRC's fledgling capital
markets.' In an effort to tap the estimated $310 billion in savings held by
Chinese citizens, the Chinese government opened the country's first national
' Joyce Barnathan, China; Birth of a New Economy, Bus. WK., January 31, 1994, at 42.
By comparison, the United States, in the midst of an economic recovery, has posted relatively
modest gains of 3.5-4% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the past year. Neville
Nankivell, A Modest Growth Forecast for the Global Economy, FIN. POST, Sept. 22, 1994,
at 11. The rapid growth of China's GDP has led to inflationary pressures in recent months.
For the twelve months ending in August 1994, the PRC's Consumer Price Index rose by
25.8%. Tony Walker, Beijing's Leadership, Panicked By Inflation, Has Brought Back Price
Controls, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at 5. Inflationary fears prompted the PRC to take
action to slow GDP growth in 1994 to a level of 9%. Ian Young, China, CHEMICAL WK.,
Aug. 31, 1994, at 1.
2 A clear example of this is China's trade surplus with the United States, which stood at
$23 billion dollars at the end of 1993, and is still growing. Bamathan, supra note 1, at 43.
China is second only to Japan in the size of its trade surplus with the United States.
Currently the United States' trade deficit with Japan hovers around $60 billion. Trade
Figures Support Diversity of U.S. Exports Illustrated By Success Stories, Bus. AM., June
1994, at 32.
3 The amount of money flooding these markets and thereby filling the coffers of Chinese
firms has been impressive from the outset. As early as June 1992, more than 360,000
individuals had bought shares on the Shenzhen exchange alone. The trading volume on the
two national equities exchanges is well over $1 billion, and it is estimated that Chinese
citizens were holding debt instruments with a value of over $12 billion as of 1992. Orville
Schell & Todd Lapin, China Plays the Market: Capitalist Leap, NATION, Dec. 14, 1992, at
734.
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stock exchange in Shanghai on December 19, 1990.4 The opening of the
Shanghai Securities Exchange was soon followed by the official recognition
of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which opened its doors to investors on
July 3, 1991.' The PRC went further in its effort to attract capital in
December 1991, when the government allowed the first "B shares" to be
offered at the Shenzhen Exchange to foreign investors.'
The markets have been quite successful in obtaining investment capital for
China's economy.7 However, fraud and corruption have plagued the
markets, leading Chinese officials to admit candidly that the markets are
among the most risky in the world.8 The lack of a national framework for
the regulation of equities trading is largely to blame for the problems
besetting the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges. 9
The disjointed nature of the markets' early development was caused
primarily by the central government's initial administrative policy concerning
the national exchanges.10 In an effort to combat problems of fraud and
corruption and gain some manner of centralized control over this experiment
with capital markets, the PRC's State Council enacted the Interim Regula-
4 Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies In China, 301
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1993).
5 Julia W. Sze, The Allure of B Shares; China Opens Securities Markets For Increased
Foreign Investment, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan. 1993, at 42.
' Currently the PRC has two basic forms of stock. Shares of stock which are available
to domestic investors are known as "A shares" and are traded on both exchanges. Foreign
investors may not trade in a corporation's "A shares" but may only invest in corporations
offering governmentally approved and listed "B shares." Issuance of "B shares" is restricted
to foreign investors. Jia Zhao, Trading Stocks in China: Regulation, Development, Issues
and Prospects, E. AsIAN ExEc. REP., June 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
7 This year the Shanghai exchange plans to issue new offerings which will raise
approximately $230 million in capital for local companies. Pete Engardio et al., Bears on a
Rampage in China, Bus. WK., July 11, 1994, at 28.
' Tony Walker & Deirdre Nickerson, Chinese Regulators Face an Unenviable Task,
FINANCIAL TIMEs, March 25, 1993, at 28.
9 Beginning in January 1994, both the Shenzhen and Shanghai markets have dropped
significantly. As of July 1994, the Shanghai exchange was down by over 60% and volumes
had fallen dramatically. The Shenzhen exchange has experienced a similar cooling effect.
A major contributing factor to this decline has been the loss of investor confidence stemming
from fraud and abuses on the exchanges. Engardio et al., supra note 7, at 28.
10 See generally David Fairlamb, Surging, Churning, China, INSTITrrONAL INVESTOR,
Jan. 1993, at 33.
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tions on the Issue and Trading of Shares on April 22, 1993.1 These
interim regulations are the first major attempt by the PRC to create a
national securities policy. They will likely serve as the legal skeleton upon
which the finalized regulations will be based.
U1. DEVELOPMENT OF EXCHANGE RuLEs
A. Shenzhen and Shanghai Measures
The Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges are an outgrowth of sustained
efforts to liberalize the Chinese economy first introduced by Chairman Deng
Xiaopeng in 1979.2 The initiatives sought to create greater productivity
on the part of state-owned enterprises by stimulating corporate investment.
1 3
Previously, capital had been available only through central government
appropriations and tightly controlled loans issued by the state-controlled
People's Bank of China (PBOC). 4 The restrictive nature of lending
regulations not only made it difficult for companies to acquire adequate
financing, but also allowed the government to assume a strong role in the
determination of how capital could be employed once it had been issued. 5
The lending policies of the PBOC had the most dramatic effect on smaller
firms. 1
6
In order to relax the strangle hold on investment capital, the PRC
experimented with the issuance of corporate stock to employees of collective
enterprises in the early 1980s. 7 The State Council formally recognized this
" Pitman B. Potter, Esq., P.R.C. State Council Issues National Stock Regulations, EAST
ASIAN EXEC. REP., July 15, 1993, at 9.
" Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 35. Since the early 1980s, the leadership of the PRC, under
the influence of Chinese economists, has developed new theories regarding the issuance and
ownership of stock, relying on Marxist notions that stock companies are a form of capital
ownership by the organized working class. See Harry Zheng, Securities Regulation in China:
Development and Conflicts, EAST ASIAN EXEC. REP., May 15, 1987, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
"3 Bersani, supra note 4, at 304.
'4 Zheng, supra note 12.
" An astounding example of this control is that of a stock company in Beijing which was
forced to obtain government approval for a capital outlay of 50 yuan, which at that time
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policy in 1983.1" The State Council also sanctioned the reorganization of
state-owned enterprises into shareholding entities, which in 1986 led to the
first major public issue of shares by a state-owned entity. 9
The dramatic effects of the reforms were demonstrated by the overnight
emergence of regional stock exchanges in the Chinese Provinces. ° The
first exchange opened in Shenyang on August 5, 1986. The establishment
of over-the-counter markets in Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Beijing,
Wuhan, and Guangzhou soon followed.'
In an attempt to gain some manner of centralized control over the
spreading wave of stock issues, the State Council released a directive in
March 1987 specifically prohibiting state-owned enterprises from offering
shares to the general public.' This had little negative impact on the overall
drive toward market development, as the benefits of stock companies were
becoming increasingly clearer and more state-owned enterprises sought
reorganization.' Prior to the official recognition of the national markets
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, innumerable curbside markets sprang up across
the country, with trading occurring in both publicly issued and internal
shares.' The PBOC, established as the PRC's central bank in 1983, was
1Id.
,9 Zhao, supra note 6. The state remained the largest shareholder in these reorganized
companies. The State Council hoped to stimulate effective management by reducing daily
government influence in operations, and to boost employee morale and productivity through
limited employee ownership, while not significantly divesting the state of its assets. The first
such company to issue shares was Shenyang Jinbei Auto Industrial Shareholding Corporation.




' See Zheng, supra note 12 (describing Directive of the State Council on Reinforcement
of Administration on Stocks and Bonds, promulgated March 28, 1987). The 1987 Directive
allowed companies to continue to use stock in three instances. First, collective enterprises
could use stock subject to the supervision and control of the government. Second, state-
owned enterprises, which had been allowed to issue shares prior to the promulgation of the
Directive, could continue to issue shares upon approval from the PBOC. Third, the Directive
permitted horizontal investment between enterprises which would not result in public issue.
Id.
2 Importantly, the 1987 Directive did not explicitly prohibit the issuance of stock by
reorganized state-owned shareholding companies. This gave entities that had previously
experimented with raising capital through issuing shares to employees a loophole to pursue
eventual public issuance of shares. Zhao, supra note 6.
" Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 35.
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delegated the task of regulating these regional exchanges.' The PBOC's
regulatory scheme allowed decentralized regulation of the regional exchanges
by the corresponding regional branches of the bank.' Naturally, this led
to a wide variety of regulatory formats across the various markets. The
regional nature of these emerging markets and the decentralized regulatory
framework of the PBOC have destabilized the growth and maturation of the
two national stock markets.29
A fundamental problem posed by the PBOC's control of the national
exchanges was the potential conflict of interest created by having the markets
supervised by the PRC's largest bank and lending institution.3  The
potential for mismanagement increased as the PBOC saw its deposits
dwindle, due in part to negative real interest rates and the attractive returns
offered in the marketplace."
The fact that central bank regulators simply did not work well together
compounded this problem. 2 In keeping with its policy of local bank
control, the Shanghai branch of the PBOC regulated the Shanghai Exchange
with little or no regard for the way the Shenzhen branch oversaw Shenzhen's
market.13 This lack of cooperation resulted in widely divergent regulatory
schemes.' Both the Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration
2 Zheng, supra note 12. The PBOC was authorized to regulate stocks, bonds, and
negotiable instruments, and to administer the PRC's financial markets under Article 5, §11,
of the Interim Regulations of Banks of 1986. Id.
' Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 38-39.
2 Id at 39.
2 Id. at 38-39.
30 Simon Holberton, Impasse or Impetus on the Road to Reform: Riots in Southern China
Pose a Dilemma for the Leadership's Programme of Liberalisation, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1992, at 17.
31 Iad This problem still persists due to high levels of inflation. In order to curb inflation,
the PRC has undertaken a policy of raising PBOC interest rates on long-term deposits to take
money out of the economy. The success of this program is dubious, as the PBOC's rates,
which are 17.64% for eight-year deposits, are still less than the annual inflation rate. China
Boosts Savings Subsidy Rate Amid Soaring Inflation, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, September 18,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter China Boosts Savings
Subsidy Rate].
32 See Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 38.
33 Id. at 39.
3' See generally Zhao, supra note 6.
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of the Trading of Securities ("Shanghai Measures") 35 and the Provisional
Measures of Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and
Trading of Shares ("Shenzhen Measures")' developed a distinctly regional
flair which existed largely unreformed until the issuance of the Interim
Regulations of April 22, 1993. 37
1. Stock Issuance
Working under the broad strokes of the 1987 Directive, the local PBOC
branches carved out individual requirements for companies in their provinces
seeking to issue stock.3  The Shenzhen Measures required that companies
wishing to issue shares be granted shareholding status under the 1987
Directive, whether the company sought to engage in public or internal
issuance or merely private placement.39 Shanghai developed two sets of
requirements for applicants planning to issue shares. Collective enterprises
desiring capital for fixed asset investment were required to file the com-
pany's articles, a prospectus, the underwriting contract, and an approval for
the capital investment with the local branch of the PBOC.4' State-owned
enterprises carried the additional burden of providing a certificate of approval
for reorganization into a stock holding company indicating the promoters'
subscription for no less than 30% of the shares and an appraisal of its
assets.41
The requirements for the application for consideration for public issuance
of shares, as opposed to internal shares and private placement of shares, also
developed along divergent lines in the two regions. The Shenzhen Measures
required applicants to have strong financial performance and assets with a
net book value of at least 10 million yuan, of which net tangible assets
.- Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of the Issue and
Trading of Shares, promulgated by the Shanghai Muncipality, Nov. 27, 1990 (discussed in
Zhao, supra note 6) [hereinafter Shanghai Measures].
' Provisional Measures of Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and
Trading of Shares, promulgated by the City Government of Shenzhen, May 15, 1991
(discussed in Zhao, supra note 6) [hereinafter Shenzhen Measures].
"' See Zhao, supra note 6.
3 id.
31 Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at arts. 5, 14-15.
' Shanghai Measures, supra note 35, at art. 9.
41 Id. at art. 10.
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constituted no less than 25%.42 Furthermore, the promoters' subscription
was required to comprise at least 35% of the total share capital and be
valued greater than 5 million yuan.4' The Shenzhen Measures also required
at least 800 identifiable shareholders, while at least 25% of the equity had
to be held by non-identifiable holders.44
In order to list for trading on the Shenzhen Exchange, an approved issuer
was required to have engaged in profitable operations for at least three years,
with a net return on capital of at least 8% in the first two years and a net
return of no less than 10% in the third year.45 In addition, the company's
shares had to be dispersed among at least 1,000 shareholders, of which over
25% could own a stake of no more than 0.5% of the firm's total equity.'
While protecting the investor and lending stability to the market, these
requirements made it extremely difficult for small and medium-sized
companies to issue and list shares for public trading on the Shenzhen
Exchange. 47
Conversely, the Shanghai Exchange developed less stringent public
issuance guidelines and fewer specific requirements for an issuing company's
prospectus."8 Absent the rigid guidelines of the Shenzhen exchange,
approval of the right to issue shares publicly was left to the total discretion
of the local PBOC authorities.49
The Shanghai Exchange's listing requirements were more advantageous for
firms seeking to list their shares. Once a company received authorization to
issue shares publicly, it had only to show (1) a positive book balance for the
previous two years, (2) 1,000 yuan in paid-in capital," (3) at least 10%
public ownership, and (4) at least 300 identifiable shareholders in order to
42 Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at art. 15. The net book value requirement of 10
million yuan is the equivalent of $1,162,290 at current exchange rates of 8.6037 yuan/dollar.
See China Boosts Savings Subsidy Rate, supra note 31.
' Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at art. 15.44 id.
4 Id at art. 37.
46 id.
47 Zhao, supra note 6.
4 Shanghai Measures, supra note 35, at arts. 9-10.
4' Zhao, supra note 6.
" Paid-in capital is the element of shareholders' equity that normally results from cash
or other assets invested in the firm. One thousand yuan is the equivalent of approximately
$125. RoGER H. HERMANSON & JAMES DON EDWARDS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTNG 622 (5th
ed. 1992).
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list on the Shanghai Exchange.51 Compared to the much more rigorous
Shenzhen Measures, these regulations were a boon to small and mid-sized
corporations seeking to have their shares traded.52
2. Disclosure Requirements
One of the major concerns arising from the creation of the national
exchanges was the protection of investors from faulty financial disclosure by
companies listing for trading on the exchanges.53 Issuing companies on
both exchanges were bound to disclose all material facts necessary for
investors to make informed decisions.' The exchanges created penalties
for issuers who misrepresented or omitted relevant financial data in their
company's prospectus.55
In Shenzhen, a violation of disclosure obligations was treated as a
technical violation. Offending issuers were subject to the publication of a
notice of criticism in the local newspaper, a fine of up to 10,000 yuan, or
roughly $1,250, and a temporary stay of quoted trading in the company's
stock. 6 In the most egregious cases, the violating issuer could be arraigned
for criminal proceedings.57
The penalties for omitting or falsifying information on the prospectus in
Shanghai were more severe than those established in Shenzhen. Under the
Shanghai Measures, improper disclosure could result in fines as high as
200,000 yuan, or approximately $25,000.58 Issuers were also accountable
for any damages incurred by any person who "acquired such securities in
good faith. 59  The Shanghai Measures, therefore, allowed individual
shareholders to sue for restitution if they were misled by the financial
disclosures of a corporation. The Shanghai Measures extended potential
"' Operation Rules of Shenzhen Securities Exchange, promulgated by the City
Government of Shenzhen, July 3, 1991, at art. 34 (discussed in Zhao, supra note 6)
[hereinafter Shenzhen Securities Exchange Rules].
52 Zhao, supra note 6.
13 Id. The disclosure requirements of the two exchanges covered most of the basic
elements found in U.S. regulation S-K and Form 10-k. Id5 'id.
5 Id.
5' Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at art. 87.
57 Id.
5" Shanghai Measures, supra note 35, at art. 75(3).
59 Id. at art. 20.
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personal liability to all managerial personnel, underwriters, and other
professionals involved in the publication of the prospectus.' Liability,
however, was based upon actual knowledge by the individuals of the
wrongdoing rather than mere negligence.61
3. Insider Trading
Both markets established limited fiduciary duties for brokers under which
they could only act with the explicit authorization of their clients.62 The
role of the broker as advisor to an investor was greatly limited under the
regulations of both exchanges, and blanket authorization for brokers to trade
or establish margin accounts on behalf of a client was strictly forbidden.63
The exchanges addressed the issue of insider trading by drafting
limitations on who could purchase issued securities. The Shanghai Measures
prohibited several classes of individuals from trading stock. These classes
included personnel of the local PBOC authority, managerial personnel of the
exchange, employees of a broker directly involved in the issuance or trading
of shares, and employees of governmental agencies regulating stock
issuers.(
Shenzhen extended these restrictions to include "all cadres of the Party
and the government instrumentalities and military servicemen on active
duty." Shenzhen also prohibited trading in certain securities for set time
periods.66 Shares issued to employees directly without underwriting could
not be traded by their holders for one year.67 Further, the Shenzhen
Measures prohibited members of the issuing corporation's board of directors
from trading their shares during their tenure, and employee holders were
restricted from trading their employer's shares in the month prior to the
release of semiannual or annual financial statements." Individual holdings
61 Zhao, supra note 6.
62 id.
' Trial Rules of Shanghai Securities Exchange, promulgated by the Shanghai Municipali-
ty on Nov. 26, 1990, at art. 76 (discussed in Thao, supra note 6) [hereinafter Shanghai
Securities Exchange Rules]; Shenzhen Securities Exchange Rules, supra note 51, at art. 38.
"Zhao, supra note 6.
65 Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at art. 29.
6Id. at art. 16.
67 Id.
"Id. at art. 41; Shenzhen Security Exchange Rules, supra note 51, at art. 205.
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of securities were limited in Shenzhen to 50,000 yuan, or approximately
$6,200.69
B. Interim Regulations
The Shenzhen and Shanghai Measures, while moderately effective, were
hampered by their lack of scope and cohesion. The decentralized regulation
of the PBOC led to large scale abuses that threatened the legitimacy of the
markets in the eyes of potential investors. One shocking example of the
widespread fraud in the regional markets occurred in Shenzhen on August
10, 1992, when citizens rioted after a botched issue of share application
forms.7° The riots prompted the State Council to take more control of the
markets, leading to the removal of the PBOC from its regulatory function in
October, 1992."' The PBOC was replaced by the newly created State
Council Securities Committee (SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC).72 These bodies were responsible for the formation
of a nationwide regulatory policy for the national markets in Shanghai and
Shenzhen and the other informal exchanges which had emerged in cities
across the PRC.73
The SCSC responded on April 22, 1993, with the promulgation of the
Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares ("Regulations").74
The document legitimizes the SCSC and the CSRC as the central regulatory
' Shenzhen Measures, supra note 36, at art. 29.
70 The riots proved to be the largest outbreak of civil unrest since the disastrous events
in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The riots were sparked after Shenzhen officials allegedly
rigged a share application offering by allowing insiders to acquire the opportunity to buy
shares in the public issue unfairly. The original five million application forms were
distributed by a number of official organizations, including the local police and Shenzhen city
authorities. China Seeks to Appease Investors After Shares Riot, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters File.
71 Jefferey Parker, China Central Bank to Shed Regulatory Role, REUrERS, LTD.,
September 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters File.
72 Anthony Rowley, Making It Safer to Trade in the Chinese Stock Markets, Bus. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 17.
" The SCSC was created to shape policies for new securities regulations which were to
be executed by the CSRC. Id.
7 Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares, promulgated by the State
Council of the PRC, April 22, 1993, reprinted in Chinese Stock Trading Regulations, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File [hereinafter Interim Regulations].
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agencies in charge of all issues and trading of shares in the PRC."
1. Stock Issuance
A central component of the Regulations is the establishment of uniform
controls over the public issuance of shares.76 In keeping with the guide-
lines established under the 1987 Directive, the Regulations stipulate that only
limited-liability companies' and state-owned companies authorized to
reorganize as limited-liability companies may issue shares.78
Under the Regulations, new enterprises established as limited-liability
corporations must meet less stringent issuance requirements than formerly
state-owned companies reorganized as limited-liability entities.79 Limited
liability companies must meet the following conditions before being
authorized to issue shares: the entity's operations must conform to the
government's industrial policy; the promoter must buy at least 35% of the
shares issued; the value of the stock the promoter must purchase must be at
least 30 million yuan, or roughly $3.7 million; and no less than 25% of the
stock must be sold to the public, while no more than 10% of the issue can
be sold to employees or managers of the corporation.'
Reorganized state-owned enterprises must meet the above criteria as well
the requirement that the company's net assets account for no less than 30%
of its total assets, with intangible assets accounting for no more than 20% of
net assets.81 These enterprises also must show net profits for three years,
with the apportionment of shares between the public and the government
determined on an ad hoc basis by the State Council of the PRC.82 These
heightened requirements for reorganized state-owned companies are designed
to preserve the value of state assets in the shift toward privatization, and to
allow the state to retain a high degree of ownership and control.
8 3
" Id. at ch. 1, art. 5.
76 Id. at ch. 1, art. 2.
' Limited-liability companies are responsible to their creditors only to the extent of their
assets. The shareholders are liable only to the extent of the shareholdings. See Bersani,
supra note 4, at 309.
78 Id. at ch. 1, art. 7.
" See Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 1, arts. 8, 9.
80 Id. at ch. 1, art. 8.
8 Id. at ch. 1, art. 9(1).
Id at ch. 1, art. 9(2).
8 Bersani, supra note 4, at 305-06.
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The application for stock issuance can be submitted for approval only after
the applicant has had its assets, credit, and financial position examined and
evaluated by such "specialized organizations as accounting fi-ms, asset
evaluation organs and lawyer offices."'" Local limited-liability firms must
then seek approval from their local governments, while reorganized state-
owned companies must gain approval from the central government. 5 All
applications are subject to re-examination by the CSRC before final approval
to make public stock offerings is awarded.'
The Regulations further require that companies desiring to list shares on
an exchange must have issued their shares publicly, resulting in no less than
50 million yuan ($6.25 million) in paid-in capital.8 7 This requirement
significantly limits the ability of small firms to list on the national exchanges
and results from the CSRC's displeasure with the much more lenient listing
provisions previously found in the Shanghai Measures. 8
After the share issue, a minimum of 1,000 individuals must hold stock
with a par value of no less than 1,000 yuan ($125), and the aggregate par
value of all stock held by individuals must not be less than 10 million yuan
($1.25 million). 9 Companies must also show a profit for each of the three
years prior to application for listing.' Again, in the interest of protecting
individuals trading on the exchanges, the Regulations have opted for
corporate performance requirements and shareholder diversity policies which
more closely resemble those promoted under the Shenzhen Measures.
2. Disclosure Requirements
The Interim Regulations place a great deal of emphasis on the disclosure
of financial information by listed corporations.9' All listed companies must
submit semi-annual interim financial reports to the CSRC.9 Annual reports
"Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 3, art. 12(1).
5 ld. at ch. 3, art. 12(2).
86 Id. at ch. 3, art. 12(3).
87 Id. at ch. 3, art. 30.
8See Shanghai Securities Exchange Rules, supra note 63, at art. 34.
89 Id.
9o Id. at ch. 3, art. 30.
91 See Interim Measures, supra note 74, at ch. 6, arts. 57-67.
2 Id at ch. 6, art. 57(1). The interim report must include the company's financial report,
an analysis of the company's financial position, significant litigation to which the company
is a party, and changes in the status of outstanding shares. hd at ch. 6, art. 58.
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must be submitted within 120 days of the end of the company's accounting
period.93 The Regulations specify that both reports must be in accordance
with the accounting standards of China.' The CSRC will then make all
reports submitted by listed companies publicly available. 95 The company
is also required to disclose publicly any significant event reasonably expected
to affect the market price of the company's shares in a material way.96
The Regulations limit the amount of stock a Chinese citizen may hold in
a single listed company to 0.5% of the company's outstanding shares.' If
a citizen purchases more than 0.5% of the outstanding shares, the offering
company must buy back the excess portion of the shares at the lower of the
original purchase price or the market price.
98
The Regulations also establish policies limiting the market activities of
corporate management, individuals involved in the securities industry, and
professionals engaged in the process of producing financial documents for
issuing corporations. Members of a corporation's management holding a 5%
stake in their company are prohibited from selling shares within six months
of their purchase, and from buying shares for six months after a sale.99 All
professional personnel in the securities industry are prohibited from trading
in shares directly or indirectly, with the exception of an approved investment
fund.1 °  Individuals who violate these regulations may be censured,
compelled to sell their shares, forced to return any illegal profits, or fined
'3 Id. at ch. 6, art. 57(2). The annual report must include, inter alia, a brief description
of the company, its products and services, and its major assets; information regarding the
company outstanding shares; and a summary of the financial position of the company for the
previous three years if applicable. Id. at ch. 6, art. 59.
9' Id. at ch. 6, art 57. The failure of the Chinese to adopt Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and continued reliance on Chinese standards has caused alarm on the part of some
potential foreign investors in China. Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 34. However, the
differences in methodology should not decrease the effectiveness of disclosure efforts aimed
at mainland investors. See Zhao, supra note 6.
95 Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 3, art. 64.
96 Id. at ch. 3, art. 60.
97 Id. at ch. 3, art. 46.
98Id.
" Id. at ch. 3, art. 38.
100 Id. at ch. 3, art. 39. This provision applies to any person employed in a securities
regulatory agency or a securities industry self-regulatory organization, as well as individuals
employed in institutions engaged in the issue and trade of securities. See also id. at ch. 3,
art. 81(17)(18) (defining "managerial personnel of the securities industry" and "workers of
the securities industry").
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between 50,000 yuan and 500,000 yuan, or up to $62,000.'0'
Legal persons (corporations) which acquire over 5% of a company's
outstanding shares must report to the company, the CSRC, and the securities
exchange within three days of the acquisition, and must similarly report any
subsequent change in position of 2% or more."° Once such a report is
made, the legal person is barred from purchasing or selling any additional
shares in the company for a two day trading period.'03
Upon amassing a stake of 30%, a legal person is required to make a tender
offer to the remaining shareholders of the company within 45 days of the
acquisition, at either the highest price the offeror paid for the shares within
the previous 12 months, or the average market price of the shares for the 30
days prior to the tender." The tender offer is valid for thirty days after
its initiation and cannot be withdrawn until the end of the thirty day
period.' °5
At the termination of this period, if the legal person holds less than 50%
of the outstanding shares in the target company, the tender offer will be
considered a failure and the number of the company's shares the offeror may
purchase each year after the failed takeover is limited to 5%.'06 If,
however, the offeror is able to amass 75% or more of the outstanding shares
of the target company, the company will be de-listed from its securities
exchange." 7 If the offeror acquires 90% of the outstanding shares, the
remaining shareholders are entitled to force the offeror to make a compulsory
purchase of their shares under the same terms of the tender offerY',
In order to curb the growing mistrust of the integrity of the markets
among shareholders, the Regulations go to great lengths to specify actions
which are subject to state sanction. Under the Regulations, companies
issuing stock without approval may be censured, forced to forfeit profits, or
fined."' 9 Furthermore, fraudulently obtaining approval to list or issue
shares or failure to issue shares in the proper manner, amount, or time frame
'o' Id. at ch. 7, art. 72.
102 Id. at ch. 5, art. 47.
103 Id.
'' Id. at ch. 5, art. 48.
'05 Id. at ch. 5, art. 49.
106 Id. at ch. 5, art. 51.
107 id.
1OB Id.
109 Id. at ch. 3, art. 70.
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will result in the imposition of fines.110 Repurchasing outstanding stock
without state approval is similarly punishable.111 Liability for these actions
may also be imposed upon individual directors, supervisors, or managers
who are directly responsible for the infraction.
112
The standard of conduct for the securities industry is also laid out in the
Regulations. Brokers and dealers are subject to censure or fines ranging
from 30,000 yuan to 300,000 yuan (up to $37,000) for engaging in illicit
activities ranging from faulty underwriting to lending clients' shares as
collateral, charging unreasonable fees, profit sharing, or providing funds or
shares to clients on a credit basis.1 In the case of gross violations of
these policies, the institution or individual involved may have its business
curtailed, its operation suspended, or its license revoked entirely.' 14
3. Insider Trading
Insider trading is dealt with severely under the Interim Regulations,
because the use of inside information in trading had seriously weakened the
viability of the markets under the system developed by the PBOC.
Violations of the prohibitions against insider trading are punishable with
fines up to 500,000 yuan ($62,000), while individuals profiting from inside
information must forfeit all profits gained from their dealings and forfeit
their share ownership. 5
The Regulations significantly limit the trading activities of certain
individuals. Professional personnel of the securities industry are generally
prohibited from trading securities on their own account.'1 6 Professional
personnel involved in the production of audits, appraisals, or other required
disclosures of listed companies are prohibited from owning shares in these
110 Id.
III I&
112 Individuals found guilty will be censured or subject to fines of no less than 30,000
yuan ($3,700) and no greater than 300,000 yuan ($37,000). d
S"Id at ch. 3, art. 71.
114 Id.
315 Id. at ch. 3, art. 72. The Regulations define an "insider" as a "natural person having
access to insider information due to the individual's holding of the issuer's shares, being a
director, supervisor, or manager of the issuer or closely related to such a person, or serving
in a regulatory or professional role." Id at ch. 3, art. 81(14).
" Id at ch. 3, art. 39. These individuals are allowed to invest in certain governmentally
approved investment funds. Id
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companies prior to the release of their reports.1 7 Furthermore, directors,
senior managers, or any individual shareholders owning 5% or more of a
company's stock are not permitted to sell their shares within six months of
their purchase."'
lf. ANALYsIs
The Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares are extremely
important to the continued growth and development of China's experiment
with equity markets. Prior to their promulgation, the two national exchanges
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well as the numerous other unofficial regional
exchanges across the People's Republic of China, were locally regulated
entities fraught with corruption. For this reason alone, the Regulations have
immense value because they demonstrate the PRC's dedication to the
concept of individual equity ownership, equity-based financing, and a viable
national securities system. From a limited standpoint, therefore, the Interim
Regulations have been quite successful at installing a uniform system of
regulation where none had existed previously. This should certainly lead to
more stable markets and increased capital investment as less speculative
investors are attracted to the more centrally controlled markets.
A. Stock Issuance
The Interim Regulations clearly define the process of application and
approval for public issuance of shares. They fail, however, to regulate
internal shares issued by corporations to their employees. The PRC has
authorized over 5,000 companies to issue internal shares as a way to raise
capital without publicly issuing stock. 9 Scores of unauthorized compa-
nies, mostly small companies in rural ares, have undertaken internal share
offerings to their employees as a means to raise needed capital. 2° The
Regulations establish severe penalties for unauthorized share issues and for
the trading of shares outside officially sanctioned securities establishments,
but have failed to reduce the burgeoning black market trading of unautho-
13 Id. at ch. 3, art. 40.
I d. at ch. 3, art. 38. Any profits realized from the early sale of these shares are
forfeited to the company.




rized internal shares. 21
The Regulations suffer from the fact that they are all punishment and no
reward with regard to internal shares. By establishing public issuing
measures which require the initiator of the issue to purchase at least 30
million yuan ($3.75 million) of the proposed issue, the Interim Regulations
effectively alienate small and medium-sized companies from the hope of
public offerings." Thus smaller companies are forced to rely on internal
issues for capital accumulation. The Regulations provide severe penalties for
illegally issuing and trading in internal shares, but give no viable alternative
for small, undercapitalized companies to raise funds.21 In this regard, the
Regulations are little better than the preceding regional schemes)2
The high standards for the public issuance of shares benefit large
companies by allowing them to raise capital at a reduced risk to investors.
Given the reality of illicit internal shares trading, however, the PRC would
have been better served, and investors better protected, by lowering the
requirements for issuing public shares."z Allowing smaller firms to issue
shares publicly would have enabled the PRC to impose disclosure policies
and extend greater control over these firms, reducing the need for black
market trading and providing greater protection to citizens involved in
internal shares trading.
The Regulations also leave in place the distinction among three types of
publicly issued shares: state-held shares, legal person shares, and individual-
ly-held shares. Of the three, only individually-held shares are freely
121 Id.
122 See Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 1, art. 8.
1 See id. at ch. 7, art. 70. Violations of the Interim Regulations with regard to issuing
shares without state approval can result in fines of up to 300,000 yuan, or roughly $37,000.
id.
" The PRC has subsequently allowed China's officially recognized bourses in Shanghai
and Shenzhen to establish "regional brokers" in order to give investors outside these areas the
opportunity to trade in the officially sanctioned shares listed on the exchanges. Celine Tng,
China Bearing Down on Its Many Underground Stock Markets, THE STRAIrS TIMES, Nov.
1, 1993, at 27. The PRC has also forced local authorities to crack down on the numerous
roadside stalls where illegal shares were openly traded. Id. These actions have reduced the
volume of illegal trading, but have done nothing to alleviate the capital shortage being faced
by many small businesses. See Underground Stock Market Thrives in China, supra note 119,
at D3.
'25 See Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 1, arts. 8-10.
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tradable.'2 The legal person shares are restricted in trading, and the state-
held shares are strictly non-tradable. 27
These restrictions keep large quantities of stock out of the market and
create spiraling demand for the remaining individual shares, increasing the
price of freely traded shares."2 Although lifting restrictions on trading
state-held and legal person shares would flood the market and cause an
initial drop in the price of shares held in the private sector, the long range
effect would be to create a rational pricing structure in which prices more
accurately reflect the actual value of listed companies.' 29
B. Disclosure Requirements
A significant advancement under the Regulations is the stringent disclosure
requirements imposed on companies issuing shares publicly and listing their
shares on the national exchanges. These requirements create a greater
degree of corporate accountability and inform and shield China's inexperi-
enced mainland investors.' The Regulations further hold management
and professionals personally liable for any material omissions or falsehoods
in the financial information in semi-annual and annual reports. 32 Howev-
er, the regulations do not specify the standard by which individual liability
will be determined. Under the now-defunct Shanghai Measures, liability was
based on actual knowledge. 3 3  The Regulations fail to state whether
individual liability will be based on actual knowledge or the more rigorous
standard of due diligence. Given the relative inexperience and general
shortage of professional personnel, the PRC should retain the lower standard
'26 One A Share: Many Gains, but Several Headaches, SouTH CHINA MORNING PRESS,
Dec. 21, 1993, at 4.
127 Id.
" The Shanghai Exchange's price-to-earnings ratio, determined by dividing a stock's
price by the company's earnings per share, hovers at roughly 58, while that of the Shenzhen
Exchange is about 31. Christine Chan, Allowing the Listing of State-Held and Legal Person
Shares Is Urgently Required, SouTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 1993, at 4.
'29 Id. at 5.
'30 Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 6, arts. 57-65.
131 zhao, supra note 6.
132 These individuals may be subject to censure and fines of up to 300,000 yuan. Interim
Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 3, arts. 70, 73.
133 See Shanghai Measures, supra note 35, at art. 20.
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of actual knowledge in the short run."3' However, as the markets develop,
it will be imperative to increase this standard to one of due diligence in order
to promote higher professional standards in the securities industry and add
legitimacy to the equities markets. 3
C. Corporate Takeovers
The Interim Regulations carefully outline the PRC's policy regarding
corporate takeovers.' 3 Interestingly, these policies have been among the
first to be tested by China's growing ranks of aggressive capitalist managers.
In October, 1993, the PRC witnessed its first attempted hostile raid. 37 The
incident proved the CSRC's willingness to monitor such actions carefully
and quickly punish disclosure violations by potential raiders. It also
illustrated one of the weaknesses of the Interim Regulations. Under the
existing scheme, the management of the company under attack has little or
no ability to fend off hostile bids. 38 One primary defensive measure is
effectively denied management due to the restriction placed on the repur-
chase of outstanding shares. 39 Currently this action can only be lawfully
undertaken if approval has been obtained from the CSRC.' 4
Potential problems also arise in this area from the standpoint of the
individual shareholder. First, a raider's tender offer will not present
shareholders with a fair valuation of their corporation. In addition, the
proposed takeover can lead to a great deal of market manipulation by the
raider at the average shareholder's expense. 4' Under the Interim Regula-
13 Zhao, supra note 6.
135 Id.
136 Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 3, arts. 47-52.
131 The hostile bid ended with Bao An Enterprises of Shenzhen failing to take over
Shanghai Yanzhong Industrial. Bao An, after driving up the share prices of its intended target
by unleashing a wave of speculative buying, aborted its efforts and realized a tidy profit of
nearly 500,000 yuan ($86,000) upon liquidation of its holdings. The CSRC later found Bao
An guilty of failing to disclose its position in Yanzhong after it had acquired over 5% of
Yanzhong's stock, and fined the company one million yuan after seizing the profits gained
from Bao An's subsequent sale of its position in Yanzhong. Jeffrey Parker, China Watchdog
Snarls Over First Hostile Takeover, REUTER AsIA-PAcIFIC Bus. REP., Oct. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
'3' See Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 5, arts. 46-52.
Id. at ch. 7, art. 70.
I40 d.
"'t Parker, supra note 137.
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tions, upon amassing 30% of a company's outstanding shares, the hostile
party must tender its offer to the shareholders.1 42 The offer is restricted to
the higher of either the highest price the offeror paid for the target com-
pany's shares within the twelve months preceding the purchase order, or the
average market price of the stock for the thirty-day period after the tender
offer has been made. 43 While this formula would potentially work in an
efficient market scenario, the present situation in China does not lend itself
to corrective market pricing due to a general lack of readily available
information.
A reflection of the reluctance of the State Council to prod the markets too
quickly to maturity can be found in the Regulations' strict prohibitions
against short-selling and borrowing of individuals shares by other investors
without their knowledge for the purpose of selling short.'"
Although the Regulations protect market stability by decreasing specula-
tive behavior on the part of investors, they create a fundamentally flawed
marketplace in which savvy investors are unable to take advantage of
overvalued companies. This creates a surreal trading environment in which
profits can only be obtained when companies' share prices increase. Given
the shortage of shares available for trading, this system has not caused any
severe problems to this date. However, as the markets grow in size and
volume, the need for short-selling to foster realistic market forces will
become evident.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Interim Regulations are a critical step in the right direction for the
continued growth and rational development of China's fledgling equities
markets. The Regulations establish a strong cornerstone around which the
PRC can base its finalized securities law. As a stop-gap measure, the
Regulations have performed quite well. However, as the national equities
markets in China continue to expand, the regulatory framework designed to
promote orderly development must also mature. Presently, the Interim
Regulations are capable of regulating China's markets; but in the future, their
lack of sophistication in several areas will become apparent. Hopefully the
142 Interim Regulations, supra note 74, at ch. 5, art. 48.
143 Id.
'4 Id. at ch. 3, arts. 71, 74.
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State Council will recognize this fact in drafting the finalized securities law.
Regulations are static, but markets very seldom are.
Benjamin R. Tarbutton

